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Five Years after Dodd-Frank: 
Unintended Consequences and 
Room for Improvement
David Arthur Skeel, JD
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), 
signed into law on July 21, 2010, was a sprawling, imperfect, 2300-plus page 
response to the worst financial crisis in the U.S. since the Great Depression.
It likely will be the only major financial reform legisla-
tion for the next generation, so it warrants regular ret-
rospectives. Marking the law’s significant anniversaries 
gives policymakers an opportunity to evaluate areas for 
correction and amendment. 
SURPRISES AND UNINTENDED 
CONSEQUENCES IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS
Five years after passage, many of Dodd-Frank’s rules 
remain unwritten and some still await proposal, which is 
not surprising given the number of issues and agencies 
involved in writing and implementation. As of the fifth 
anniversary in July, only 63% of rules had been finalized, 
while about 20% had missed deadlines, the majority of 
which concern derivatives and mortgage reforms (Figure 
1).1 What is surprising, however, is that there is still 
so much regulatory pressure on systemically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs), particularly big banks. 
Many insiders expected from the outset that banks 
would be inducing regulatory rollbacks by now, but that 
has not happened.2
There are many reasons why regulators’ policing 
efforts remain aggressive and why the U.S. is not moving 
SUMMARY
• This brief offers a 5-year retrospective on Dodd-Frank, pointing 
out aspects of the legislation that would benefit from correction 
or amendment.
• Dodd-Frank has yielded several key surprises—in particular, 
the extent to which the Federal Reserve has become the primary 
regulator of the financial industry. This reflects a problem, 
namely that the regulatory framework established by Dodd-
Frank violates the requirements of the rule of law. It relies too 
heavily on regulatory discretion, is insulated from effective 
oversight, and eschews transparency.
• In light of Dodd-Frank’s departures from rule of law, the legisla-
tion could be improved in several ways: by clarifying the rules 
by which regulators designate entities as strategically important 
financial institutions (SIFIs) and require their creation of living 
wills; providing better incentives for banks to downsize more 
efficiently; curbing incentives for banks to shift key operations 
to the shadow banking system; instituting bankruptcy reforms 
that would discourage government bailouts; and easing regu-
latory burdens on smaller banks that are disproportionately 
burdened by the SIFI designation process.
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in a less regulatory direction after five 
years, but three causes stand out. The 
first is the London Whale incident 
of 2012, which single-handedly 
accounted for the severity of the 
Volcker Rule. The London Whale, a 
nickname given to JPMorgan trader 
Bruno Iksil, whose job entailed trad-
ing for his firm’s own account (i.e., 
proprietary trading), developed an 
excessively large position in the credit 
default swap market that had to be 
written down as a loss. When the dust 
settled, the activities of this one trader 
caused a $6.2 billion loss for his firm.3 
This type of high-capacity, high-risk 
trading within commercial banking 
and lending institutions like JPMor-
gan is what the Volcker Rule seeks 
to eliminate by limiting proprietary 
trading and separating it from a bank’s 
normal, market-making and client-
based activities. How the rule will 
work in practice is not so clear cut.4
An unintended consequence of 
Dodd-Frank is that the Volcker Rule 
already has pushed several critical 
banking functions into the shadow 
banking system and it likely will con-
tinue to do so.5 Big banks appear to 
be retrenching on some of the opera-
tions the law permits them to engage 
in, such as market-making and trading 
for clients. This is especially true in 
the case of bonds and is leading to 
liquidity issues in the bond market 
because banks have cut back on per-
missible and borderline bond trading 
as they have shed their proprietary 
trading businesses. As more and more 
activity moves into the shadow bank-
ing system, proprietary trading could 
become less regulated (and more 
elaborately disguised), defeating the 
initial intentions of the Volcker Rule.
The second spur for the surpris-
ingly aggressive Dodd-Frank rule-
making is the LIBOR scandal, a 
story that broke on the heels of the 
London Whale. Several British and 
international news agencies exposed 
widespread, fraudulent manipulation 
of LIBOR rates in trades between big 
banks, which colluded for over two 
decades to boost appearances of cred-
itworthiness and to increase profits 
from this rate rigging. U.S. deriva-
tives—a several hundred trillion dollar 
market—and other financial products 
benchmark their interest rates on 
LIBOR, so this manipulation affected 
markets and consumers around the 
world, but especially in the U.S. The 
British government gained oversight 
of LIBOR after much investigation, 
and new regulations soon passed the 
U.K. Parliament. In the U.S., this inci-
dent and the London Whale scandal 
increased scrutiny into banks with 
global trading operations at a time 
when U.S. agencies were in the midst 
of Dodd-Frank rulemaking.
The third explanation for the 
current regulatory climate is Sena-
tor Elizabeth Warren (D-MA). The 
election of Warren to the Senate was 
an unintended consequence of critics’ 
successful derailment of her nomi-
nation to head the new Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 
which was inspired by Warren’s own 
research as a Harvard professor. If 
Warren had been approved as the first 
CFPB head, she wouldn’t have run for 
the Senate. Since joining Congress in 
2013, Warren has deftly utilized her 
new platform and committee posi-
tions, particularly her role in the Sen-
ate Committee on Banking, Housing, 
and Urban Affairs, to champion tough 
financial regulation and consumer 
protection among her colleagues and 
in the media. The CFPB, which she 
also helped to implement as an advi-
sor to the President, has been a valu-
able and necessary innovation, but the 
Bureau does have a designated source 
of funding and a centralized structure, 
which makes overturning any of their 
decisions difficult. The CFPB will 
need to avoid mission creep in the 
long-run to avoid becoming another 
 1  http://graphics.wsj.com/dodd-frank-anniversary/. 
 2 One major exception is the so-called “swaps pushout” rule. 
This would have required banks to move their derivatives 
trading out of their commercial bank subsidiaries, but was 
repealed as part of budget legislation.
 3  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-21/
jpmorgan-directors-don-t-have-to-face-london-whale-loss-
claims. 
 4  The Volcker Rule did not take effect until July 2015.
 5  The shadow banking system refers to the entirety of non-
bank financial intermediaries that perform many of the 
same functions commercial banks do, but without oversight. 
Shadow banks raise funds to buy assets, but they have no 
deposit insurance and no recourse to the Federal Reserve 
in a crisis. Examples include hedge funds, money market 
mutual funds, structured investment vehicles, and many 
other types of entities. (For more, see: http://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/ft/fandd/2013/06/basics.htm). 
 6  This concern has merit, given recent loan regulations issued 
by the CFPB affecting auto dealers and for-profit colleges, 
among other types of non-financial entities.
 7  For more information, see Susan Wachter, “Next Steps in 
the Housing Finance Reform Saga,” Penn Wharton Public 
Policy Initiative Issue Brief, March 2015: http://publicpolicy.
wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/v3n2.php. 
 8  For more information on bank stress-tests, see Itay Gold-
stein, “Disclosure of Bank Stress-Test Results,” Penn Whar-
ton Public Policy Initiative Issue Brief, June 2013: http://
publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/issue-brief/v1n6.php. 
 9  The Fed recently released its proposed rule implementing 
NOTES
3publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu
negative, unintended consequence of 
Dodd-Frank.6
Another striking development 
(or lack thereof ) in the last five years 
is lawmakers’ failure to reform Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac since the 
federal government placed them in 
conservatorship in 2008. The U.S. 
Treasury has been collecting all profits 
from these entities since Fannie and 
Freddie began making them again 
in 2012, so in that sense the lack of 
reform and restructuring is not shock-
ing. But because these institutions 
were key factors in the financial crisis, 
their exclusion from new legislation 
was odd five years ago and the con-
tinual absence of Fannie and Freddie 
reform is no less curious. Their limbo 
status in conservatorship effectively 
halts any significant housing finance 
reform measures going forward.7
The final major surprise over the 
last five years is the extent to which 
the Federal Reserve has become the 
primary regulator of the financial 
industry via both Dodd-Frank and 
non-Dodd-Frank stress-tests, as well 
as living wills (see below).8 Dodd-
Frank did limit the emergency power 
of the Fed by prohibiting it from 
making emergency loans to individual 
institutions in an attempt to discour-
age future bailouts akin to those made 
in 2008.9 But the Fed’s enforcement 
of capital and liquidity standards now 
appears to be the most important reg-
ulatory development of Dodd-Frank, 
and this is one of several “rule of law” 
concerns to which we now turn.
EVALUATING DODD-FRANK 
UNDER THE RULE OF LAW
The rule of law, according to the 
Resolution of the Council of the 
International Bar Association (2005), 
“establishes a transparent process 
accessible and equal to all. It ensures 
adherences to principles that both 
liberate and protect.” In the context 
of financial regulation, the rule of 
law requires that any intervention 
by regulators be governed by legal 
rules and not merely by discretion-
ary choice. In matters of discretion, 
policy must be decided by those who 
write the rules and not by those who 
enforce them. The rule of law, there-
fore, requires legal provisions to be 
specific. Furthermore, in the instance 
this restriction.
 10  David Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the 
Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences (Hobo-
ken, NJ, 2011).
 11  In its short life, the FSOC already has considered designat-
ing as SIFIs such entities as mutual funds and hedge funds, 
whose catastrophic impact upon theoretical failure is clearly 
debatable.
12 http://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-fdic-rebuke-bank-
rup tcy-p lans-o f -11-o f -na t i ons-b igges t -banks-
1407270607?alg=y.
 13  Single point of entry (SPOE), to oversimplify, entails taking 
over a holding company, establishing a bridge institution, 
and transferring all secured debt and short-term liabilities 
of the holding company to the bridge institution, as well 
as all licenses and other assets. Company stock and bond 
debt would remain with the holding company.  The old stock 
would likely be canceled, and the bondholders would receive 
stock in the new bridge institution in place of their debt.  The 
new bridge institution would thus be a recapitalized version 
of the failed holding company.  In recent months, the banks 
have suggested they would shed assets in connection with 
the recapitalization, which looks somewhat more like a 
liquidation than previous versions of the SPOE strategy. 
 14  http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-03-20/
volcker-rule-will-cost-banks-up-to-4-3-billion-occ-says. 
 15  The one day stay on derivatives does not apply to derivatives 
traded outside the U.S., and the largest banks have many 
subsidiaries overseas that engage in this activity. This ap-
pears to be part of the reason that the Fed failed the 11 liv-
NOTES
Source: DavisPolk, “Dodd-Frank Progress Report,” July 16, 2015.
FIGURE 1: FIVE YEARS LATER: DODD-FRANK RULEMAKING PROGRESS (JULY 2015)
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of a violation or a regulatory interven-
tion, the affected person or institution 
must have recourse to their right of 
due process. The regulatory frame-
work established by Dodd-Frank vio-
lates all of these rule of law require-
ments. It relies heavily on regulatory 
discretion, is insulated from effective 
oversight, and eschews transparency.
Operating under the assumption 
that giant financial institutions are 
inevitable and that the federal gov-
ernment should simply make sure it 
has the tools to control them, Dodd-
Frank foments a partnership between 
the government and the largest banks 
which began during the financial 
crisis when regulators rescued Bear 
Stearns—one of the nation’s largest 
investment banks—rather than allow-
ing Bear Stearns to file for bankruptcy 
in early 2008. This mistake shaped the 
subsequent actions of regulators, as 
well as the way that another invest-
ment bank, Lehman Brothers, chose 
to operate (and not seek to sell itself ) 
before its own failure later that year. 
The partnership between the govern-
ment and the biggest banks resembles 
the European style of regulation 
known as corporatism, which is far 
removed from the rule of law virtues 
traditionally associated with U.S. 
financial regulation.10
There are four important com-
ponents of Dodd-Frank that violate 
the rule of law. The first is a feature 
of Title I, which gives regulators 
the authority to designate financial 
institutions as systemically important. 
Bank holding companies that have 
more than $50 billion in assets are 
automatically deemed to be SIFIs 
and, as of late 2015, regulators from 
the new Financial Stability Over-
sight Council (FSOC) have desig-
nated as systemically important four 
other institutions: AIG, Prudential, 
GE Capital, and Metropolitan Life 
(although MetLife is contesting its 
SIFI status in court). Not only is this 
designation process overinclusive for 
bank holding companies, for already 
many regional banks that surpass the 
$50 billion asset threshold are strug-
gling with compliance requirements 
designed to apply equally to global 
behemoths, but it is highly arbitrary 
for other SIFIs, as well, since the 
FSOC faces few real constraints on 
which institutions to designate.11 
Title I reveals the problem with 
corporatism most starkly. SIFIs are 
subject to stricter regulations, includ-
ing more stringent capital standards, 
but the largest SIFIs also have special 
relationships with their regulators 
who, through the law, protect them 
from competition.
The second rule of law concern is 
another feature of Title I that requires 
institutions designated as SIFIs to 
prepare a rapid resolution plan each 
year, often referred to as a living will. 
Living wills are plans for how an 
institution would pursue an orderly 
bankruptcy in such a way as to mini-
mize systemic damage. These plans 
are valuable and a welcome inclusion 
in Dodd-Frank because they can be 
used to simplify the structures of 
large financial institutions for regu-
lators, but in practice their use has 
been far from transparent. The Fed 
and the FDIC have complete discre-
tion to accept or reject a living will 
(with punishments attached), and in 
2014 they chose to reject the living 
wills of 11 banks with assets greater 
than $250 billion.12 If this were an 
instance of clear cut non-compliance, 
the regulations would be working 
effectively. But the priorities and  
considerations of regulators in evalu-
ating these living wills are opaque  
and not connected to any formal, 
public legal framework. Such cloudy 
regulatory intervention gives banks a 
strong incentive to be non-transpar-
ent themselves about their operations, 
contrary to the intended spirit of 
Dodd-Frank.
NOTES
ing wills in 2014. The Fed felt that single point of entry would 
not work without a stay on derivatives globally.  The living 
will reprimands resulted in a new International Swaps and 
Derivatives Association (ISDA) protocol that mandates just 
that – a global one day stay. Every major bank has agreed to 
abide by the terms of the ISDA protcol.
16 Dodd-Frank gives the Fed authority to rescue a failing 
clearinghouse.
17 A similar policy was recommended in a bill sponsored by 
Senators Sherod Brown (D-OH) and David Vitter (R-LA) in 
2013. For more on that bill, see: http://dealbook.nytimes.
com/2013/05/01/in-brown-vitter-bill-a-banking-overhaul-
with-possible-teeth/?_r=0.
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The third concern involves the 
Orderly Liquidation Authority under 
Title II, which was created to give 
regulators, in this case the Treasury, 
the Fed, and the FDIC, the authority 
to take over a financial institution fac-
ing an impending failure which could 
result in systemic harm. Regulators 
can trigger a takeover resolution by 
submitting a petition in federal court 
with extremely limited judicial review 
(24 hours). The speed and secrecy (the 
hearing itself is unannounced) of the 
decision essentially prevents compa-
nies from challenging a takeover. This 
process is likely unconstitutional, as 
it appears to violate the due process 
requirements of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, although it would be difficult in 
practice for a SIFI to challenge the 
violation before its takeover occurred.
For the moment, regulators thus 
have largely unchecked discretion 
over whether and when to take over 
a financial institution on the verge 
of default, as well as how to resolve 
the situation once the SIFI goes 
into receivership. As in the case of 
an ordinary bank resolution, Title II 
grants the FDIC blanket authority 
to pay claims to creditors in full if it 
wishes, and it also allows for estab-
lished priority payment rules to be 
abandoned for the sake of systemic 
stability. Interestingly, despite the fact 
that Title II requires that its resolu-
tion provisions be used to liquidate 
troubled SIFIs and not to reorganize 
them, the FDIC has been explor-
ing a strategy for resolving SIFI 
issues (i.e., reorganizing) over the last 
few years. Senator Barbara Boxer’s 
(D-CA) “thou shalt liquidate” man-
date may be the clearest directive of 
the entire Dodd-Frank Act, but the 
FDIC’s stated intention to utilize 
the so-called “single point of entry” 
strategy in the case of a future failure 
to recapitalize SIFIs seems to be in 
direct conflict with the language of 
Title II.13 How this will play out in 
practice bears watching.
The final rule of law issue involves 
the Volcker Rule. As noted above, this 
rule attempts to achieve a 21st century 
version of the Glass-Steagall Act’s 
separation of commercial and invest-
ment banking by prohibiting bank 
holding companies from engaging in 
proprietary trading and by limiting to 
3% of total assets their investments 
in hedge funds and equity funds. This 
is a quixotic quest because it is nearly 
impossible to distinguish proprietary 
trading from normal market-making 
and client-based trading. Over time, 
even the line between investment 
and commercial banking within bank 
holding companies likely will blur,  
and the five different regulators 
charged with enforcing the Volcker 
Rule will not be able to sufficiently 
monitor trading in the world’s largest 
financial institutions. 
Beyond the clear and already pres-
ent failures and inefficiencies of the 
Volcker Rule, the costs of compliance 
and implementation have skyrock-
eted to $4.3 billion and $413 million, 
respectively. The burden falls dispro-
portionately on smaller community 
and regional banks that don’t have 
legal resources comparable to the  
biggest banks.14 This causes an eco-
nomic drag when smaller banks are 
unable to make loans to small and 
mid-sized businesses at the level they 
might in the absence of these vast 
compliance challenges. 
OBSERVATIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
IMPROVING DODD-FRANK
One area of reform that Dodd-Frank 
largely got right concerns derivatives. 
The derivatives regulations in the 
law have been encouraging thus far, 
especially the creation of clearing-
houses for over-the-counter trading, 
the increased disclosure requirements, 
and the establishment of a one day 
stay on derivatives.15 The majority of 
interest rate swaps and credit default 
swaps now are being cleared over the 
exchanges, although foreign exchange 
and commodities derivatives did 
escape the new regulations. By requir-
ing clearing, Dodd-Frank substitutes 
one type of too big to fail institution 
for another (yet another unintended 
consequence), but this is likely an 
improvement from the pre-crisis envi-
ronment because regulators should be 
able to better manage a failing clear-
inghouse than they would a large bank 
with its complicated organizational 
structure.16 
Given Dodd-Frank’s unintended 
consequences and departures from  
the rule of law, how might the legisla-
tion be improved? Here are several 
recommendations. 
Recommendation 1: Restore the 
rule of law by reducing regulator dis-
cretion. One obvious corrective might 
be to require greater transparency and 
clearer rules for Title I’s designation 
and living will processes.
Recommendation 2: Relatedly, 
policymakers should give banks an 
incentive to downsize efficiently, 
as opposed to creating a blanket 
prohibition on proprietary trading. 
This would help to ensure that these 
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institutions do not also retreat from 
market-making and client services, 
which hurts system-wide liquidity, 
and that less activity gets pushed 
into the shadow banking system, 
which already is occurring because 
of the Volcker Rule. One solution 
might be onerous capital require-
ments on banks above a certain 
asset level (e.g., $500 billion), which 
would let banks decide for them-
selves how to shed businesses.17
Recommendation 3: Policy-
makers should be mindful of activity 
outside the traditional financial 
system and curb the incentives to 
shift key operations to the shadow 
banking system. This could include 
shadow banking regulations or new 
SIFI regulations focused on risk 
level rather than capital level, type 
of activity, or entity. Any regulations 
based on risk and not on entity type 
would require collapsing regulators 
(e.g., SEC and CFTC), and while 
there is little to no appetite for  
that in Washington, reforms that 
point in this direction are worth 
serious consideration.
Recommendation 4: To further 
reduce regulators’ incentive to bail 
out large troubled financial institu-
tions, lawmakers should adopt a 
handful of bankruptcy reforms that 
would better facilitate a financial 
institution bankruptcy. The most 
important change involves imposing 
a stay, or a standstill, on derivatives 
counterparties when a SIFI declares 
bankruptcy. The derivatives industry 
managed to get an exemption from 
the normal bankruptcy rules, which 
mandate that collections be stopped 
immediately, contracts cannot be 
terminated, and collateral cannot be 
sold. In the last five years, there has 
been movement around this issue to 
help SIFIs on the verge of default by 
enacting bankruptcy reform similar 
to the single point of entry strategy. 
Legislation on this issue, which 
would include derivatives, is pending 
in Congress.
Recommendation 5: Off-ramps 
for small banks that are dispro-
portionately burdened by the SIFI 
designation process’s size limits 
and CFPB regulations would be 
beneficial. A bill sponsored by 
Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), for 
instance, would authorize regulators 
to subject banks between $50 billion 
and $500 billion in assets to Title I 
oversight, but would make inclusion 
automatic only at the $500 billion 
level. The Shelby bill would further 
ease regulatory burdens on banks 
and credit unions with less than $10 
billion in assets, as these institutions 
would no longer need to abide by 
the Volcker Rule. 
CONCLUSION
The Dodd-Frank Act sought to limit 
risk in the financial system before a 
SIFI failure or crisis (and thus limit 
the amount of activity flowing into 
the shadow banking system) by reg-
ulating key instruments, like deriva-
tives, and institutions, like banks and 
insurance companies. The law also 
sought to limit damage in the event 
of any systemically important finan-
cial institution’s failure. Although 
the objectives and some of the 
new regulations are admirable, the 
legislation attempts to accomplish 
its dual mandate through corporatist 
regulations that stray from tradi-
tional U.S. rule of law virtues, and 
it has spawned a series of negative, 
unintended consequences. But the 
law can be corrected and improved. 
Dodd-Frank still has the potential 
to help safeguard the financial sys-
tem if some of its obvious kinks are 
worked out.
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